Abstract: The U.S.-controlled occupation imposed on Japan in the late 1940s an American-style securities statute. The U.S. statute did not ban insider trading at the time, and neither did the new Japanese law. Not until the 1960s did U.S. prosecutors and judges start to criminalize insider trading. Their Japanese counterparts did not follow their lead, and as of the mid-1980s had left insider trading largely unpoliced. In 1988, the Japanese Diet banned and criminalized insider trading. Rather than use a vague rule like 10b-5, it carefully specified which investors, which trades, and which contexts would trigger the ban. In 2004, it added an administrative surcharge regime. Commentators in Japan ostensibly urged the Diet to adopt the bill because they hoped to restore investor confidence in the stock market. If the ban restored investor confidence, it did not show. Shortly after the ban took effect, the Japanese stock market collapsed.
3continue, the health and fairness of the securities market would suffer. The trust of investors in the markets would disappear. To retain that health and trust, the regulation of insider trading was essential."4 Along the same line, a standard securities handbook declared that "insider trading blocks the fair development of prices, and erodes the trust of investors in securities markets. Necessarily, it prevents the healthy development of those markets." And so in 1988 the Japanese Diet passed a statute. To facilitate Sec. 16(b)-equivalent claims, it told designated insiders to report their trades to the regulators. It ordered those regulators to scour the reported trades and notify firms of any claims they should raise. 5 To facilitate criminal prosecutions of insider trading, the Diet passed an additional, entirely new framework. It specified the people subject to its new insider-trading ban. It detailed the firms and trades covered. It listed the information that could be material, and authorized detailed rules about what counted as disclosure.
Draft it and they will sue. Firms still never sue for insider trading under the corporate fiduciary duty provisions. Prosecutors still never file charges under the old Rule 10b-5equivalent. But since 1988, firms have regularly claimed and recovered under the Sec.-16(b)analogue. Prosecutors have regularly charged investors for criminal insider trading under the new statutory sections.
Investor faith and trust in the market? Once the new rules took effect, investors massively pulled their funds. From 1988 to 1990, the number of shares traded on Japanese exchanges fell from 283 billion to 123 billion. By 1992, they fell to 66 billion. In the four years after the Diet banned insider trading, in other words, the number of shares traded fell by an astonishing 77 percent ( Corporate Law: 1. In the U.S. --Suppose a CEO knows his firm's stock is underpriced. He approaches a shareholder, and offers to buy his stock. Under some traditional (i.e. , pre-1934) American case law, he owed a fiduciary duty to that shareholder. If he bought the stock without disclosing what he knew of the underpricing, he violated that duty and owed the shareholder his profit.6 Other cases found no such duty to shareholders.7 And even those that did describe officers as agents for the shareholders did not necessarily stop them from selling their stock on inside information. After all, the buyer became a shareholder only after he bought the stock. At the time of the purchase, he was not yet a shareholder --and the CEO owed him no duty. Absent a fiduciary duty, non-disclosure is not fraudulent: caveat emptor . 8 Nonetheless, that a CEO was not the shareholders' fiduciary did not mean he could keep his profits. The question for the courts was not whether he was a fiduciary. He was. It was whether he was a fiduciary to the shareholders, or "only" to the corporation. By standard agency principles, agents may not make "secret profits" on opportunities they acquire through their agency. Instead, they owe their profits to their principal.9 If a CEO serves as agent for his firm, then he owes his insider trading profits to it. As the Second Restatement of Agency put it:
[If a director] has "inside" information ...[, then] profits made by him in stock transactions undertaken because of his knowledge are held in constructive trust for the principal. He is also liable for profits made by selling constructive information to third persons, even though the principal is not adversely affected. 10And so the U.S. courts sometimes (but not always) held. Officers who traded on information they acquired through their position could find that they owed their profits to the firm. 11 2. In Japan. --The Japanese Corporate Code similarly requires fiduciary duties of directors.12 It declares a director an agent of the firm (Corporate Code, Sec. 330), and imposes on him a duty of loyalty to it (Sec. 355).13 According to the Supreme Court, the duty follows from of the general fiduciary duty that the Civil Code imposes on all agents. Although the Corporate Code does not explicitly require a fiduciary duty of non-director officers, officers are agents too. By the Supreme Court's logic, they owe fiduciary duties to the firm as well. Formally, directors and officers would seem to owe the firm any profits they made on inside information. Given that they owe their duties to the firm, however, they apparently do not owe them to the shareholders. If they trade on inside information, they thus would not (absent more) owe those shareholders their profits. Instead, by the logic of the Second Restatement, they would owe those profits to the firm. 14 Some commentators do imply that directors should pay their insider profits to their firm. "Where a fiduciary transacts with a third party for himself," writes Michio Hamada, professor of law at Nagoya University, he should be "deemed to have engaged in the transaction for the benefit of his principal." When he sells, he "acquires the proceeds for the sake of his beneficiary. As a result, that beneficiary can demand that he transfer those proceeds to it." 15 It has been a route the courts did not take. I found no corporate law cases that held insiders liable to the firm on their trades. Neither did I find any commentary that claimed that courts actually did so. Instead, Hideki Kanda, professor of law at the University of Tokyo, explains that such an approach would not fit well with the language of the Code. Elsewhere (Sec. 423; Sec. 266 of the pre-2004 Commercial Code), the Corporate Code specifies the scope 16of a director's liability to the firm in elaborate detail. Should he cause it to pay too large a dividend, he is liable for the excess. Should he waste corporate assets, he is liable for the loss. In a variety of situations, the statute details what he owes. By the usual implication, if it does not detail something, he does not owe it. As the statute does not tell him to pay the firm his insider profits, he does not owe them.
B. Securities Law: 1. In the U.S. --At the time that the lawyers in the American-dominated occupation rewrote Japanese corporate and securities law in the late 1940s, U.S. regulators expected courts to police insider trading through Sec. 16(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act. If an officer, director, or dominant (over 10-percent) shareholder made money buying and selling his firm's stock within a six-month period, the corporation could sue him for his gains (the section imposes no criminal sanctions). If he refused to pay and blocked the suit, a shareholder could sue derivatively to enforce its right. To let investors learn about the insiders' profits, Sec. 16(a) required officers, directors, and dominant shareholders regularly to disclose their trades. 17 Although U.S. firms still recover profits under Sec. 16(b), the provision no longer lies at the core of insider trading jurisprudence. Instead, Sec. 10(b) of the 1934 Act has taken its place.18 For the last four decades, American regulators and courts have policed insider trading through the anti-fraud provisions of Sec. 10(b)'s Rule 10b-5: It shall be unlawful for any person ... a. To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, b. To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made ... not misleading, or c. To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates ... as a fraud or deceit ..., in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. For the violators, criminal penalties apply. Sometimes courts impose civil sanctions as well. Rule 10b-5 says nothing about insider trading, of course. As eventually articulated by the Supreme Court, the rule (sort of) applies anyway because: (i) the rule bans fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of securities; (ii) non-disclosure is fraudulent when a trader owes a fiduciary duty to his counter-party; and (iii) officers and directors owe that fiduciary duty to their shareholders. Table those court opinions that declare that directors and officers owe this fiduciary duty only to the firm itself. Table too the fact that an insider who sells his stock may trade with someone who is not yet (at the moment of purchase) a shareholder at all. Invoke propositions (i) through (iii) anyway, and the courts can (sort of) plausibly declare insider trading (by officers and directors) a violation of Rule 10b-5. The SEC adopted Rule 10b-5 in 1942, but it did not adopt it to ban insider trading. It began applying it to insider trading only in the early 1960s. William Cary (of "race for the bottom" fame) taught corporate law at Columbia, but from 1961 to 1964 chaired the SEC. In the Ramseyer: Page 6 Commission's internal, uncontested consent opinion to In re Cady Roberts,1920 he announced that an investor who traded on nonpublic information violated Rule 10b-5:
An affirmative duty to disclose material information has been traditionally imposed on corporate "insiders," particularly officers, directors, or controlling stockholders. We, and the courts have consistently held that insiders must disclose material facts which are known to them by virtue of their position but which are not known to persons with whom they deal and which, if known, would affect their investment judgment. 21 and the modern 10b-5-based insider-trading jurisprudence began. As Cary well knew, the statement was preposterous legal history. The SEC had taken no such position. Neither had the courts. Cary was trying to move the SEC into an entirely new field, and praying the courts would follow. They did. The Second Circuit adopted this logic in 1969 in Texas Gulf Sulphur , 22 Some observers never reconciled themselves to the change, of course. Justice Powell was one. "The SEC," he insisted, "should have gone to Congress long ago" instead of inventing "expansive rules" that pushed the "vague language" of § 10(b) "to the edge of rationality." He fought a losing cause. The lower courts went with Cary rather than Powell, and by 1980s the use of 10b-5 as an insider-trading ban had become the norm. For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of secrets obtained by an officer or principal shareholder of a listed company by reason of his office or status, any profit realized by him from any purchase of a specified security of the listed company and sale within a period of six months, or from any sale of of a specified security and purchase within a period of six months, shall be recoverable by the listed company. 30 With a Sec.-16(a)-analogue available, firms and shareholders have filed claims. Some appear in the press --e.g. , a 2008 claim against the U.S.-based activist fund Steel Partners.31 Others appear among reported judicial opinions. Courts uphold the provision against constitutional challenges (violation of property rights). Consistently, they take a prophylactic approach similar to that in the U.S. Firms need not show any damages, for example, and need not show that the defendant had access to any inside information.
3. Rule 10b-5 in Japan. The Americans also imposed on Japan a Rule-10b-5-equivalent.
The provision currently appears in Sec. Despite this phenomenal market performance, some scholars and bureaucrats still thought the situation unacceptable. Without criminal and civil penalties against insiders, they argued, investors would not trust the stock market. Worried that insiders rigged the game, investors would avoid it. And if investors avoided it then firms would avoid it too. Without heavier sanctions for insider trading, argued scholars and bureaucrats, the Japanese economy could never grow. To solve this perceived problem, the Diet passed a statute. Under the new regime, if an officer or director bought or sold his firm's stock while holding material non-public information, he faced criminal penalties. If he bought or sold shares in a tender offer target, he faced criminal penalties. And if a tippee with that non-public information bought or sold stock, he faced the penalties too. The rules detail a formalistic regime. It is much more formal than the Rule 10b-5 criminal (and civil) jurisprudence in the U.S., but less formal than that of Sec. 16(b). It covers a narrower set of trades than Rule 10b-5, and a broader set than Sec. 16(b).
(b) Who is covered? The 1988 rules apply to a discrete group of specified insiders. The list is exclusive: if a trader is not on it, he is not subject to the rules. 36 (i) Employees. The statute applies to officers, directors, and others who work at the firm.37 Note that it bans them from trading only on information they acquire on the job. Suppose a friend tips a fellow employee information over drinks after work. The employee is not liable as an employee. Instead, he is liable only as a tippee. Although he is liable in either case, the distinction matters --because if he tips someone else, that other person would be liable only if he (the tipper) learned the information as an employee rather than a tippee. As explained below, secondary tippees may safely trade under the 1988 rules. 38 (ii) Major shareholders. The Japanese Corporate Code gives shareholders with at least a 3-percent stake access to the corporate books. If a shareholder acquires information through that access, he may not trade on it (FPTA, Sec. 166(a)(2)). If other investors (e.g. , creditors) obtain similar access, they may not trade on the information either. 39 (iii) Legal authorities. People (e.g., regulators) with legal authority over a company may not trade on any information they acquire through their authority (Sec. 166(a)(3)).
(iv) Contract partners. A firm (or person) that obtains information about another firm through its contractual ties or through negotiations over contractual ties may not trade. 40 The rule may cover attorneys, accountants, and bankers, as all three work for (or with) a firm under contract --though if they are also agents of the firm, they may fall within the category of "employees" (above) as well.
(v) Former insiders. Anyone subject to the ban will continue to be covered by it for a year after his affiliation with the firm ends (Sec. 166(a)). Rather than ask when an insider's fiduciary duty to the firm stops, the Japanese statute imposes a bright-line 1-year rule.
